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Brazil’s New Path to Meaningful
Intellectual Property Protection
Luiz Miranda*
Today in Brazil, it takes over eleven years to receive legal
rights to an invention by means of a patent. This state of affairs provides inadequate intellectual property protection
for inventors and businesses, hampering Brazil’s desire to
accelerate innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic
growth through a national patent system. But a new Joint
Agreement between the Government of the United States and
the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil could
mean rescue is on the way. Both governments agreed to engage in patent work sharing programs between the two patent offices, in hopes of increased efficiency. Yet, some scholars have warned of dangers and impossibilities such programs could cause, such as an even greater backlog of patents waiting to be prosecuted by a flood of new patent filings.
This Note addresses the concerns raised by other scholars
by providing an alternative scenario, using data from similarly executed patent work sharing programs, along with
data from the Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program
*
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already underway, as a basis for its proposition. It explains
why Brazil continues to pursue a working patent system, and
also provides extensive background in how patent work
sharing programs work. Finally, it explains how a properly
executed program between the United States and Brazil
could work, and why this Joint Agreement could mark the
beginning of a new path to meaningful intellectual protection in Brazil.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are an inventor in the United States who has developed a revolutionary new technology in the field of communications. You seek worldwide intellectual protection of your invention
via patents and take the appropriate steps to obtain it. You receive a
patent in Canada one year later and in the United States the following year. However, in Brazil, the seventh-largest economy in the
world, and where your technology is being widely used, a patent has
yet to be issued eleven years after you filed for it.
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Brazil has been struggling with its patent system as a means of
intellectual property protection for some time. From an enforcement
perspective, the patent system is relatively well accepted and
properly litigated.1 However, the process of obtaining a patent in
Brazil is at best ineffective and at worse entirely broken. Nevertheless, the country could be on the brink of becoming a meaningful
player in the global patent protection system, and it may happen with
help from the United States. This article will analyze how the expedited examination fast lanes that patent work sharing programs provide may be the solution Brazil has been waiting for.
The Brazilian Intellectual Property Association (“ABPI”), a
leading non-profit organization that works in matters related to the
doctrine and jurisprudence of intellectual property law in Brazil, has
recognized the value of an operational patent system as a way to
grow the national economy, increase industry competitiveness, and
attract investments.2 The Brazilian highest authorities agree.3
On June 30, 2015, the Government of the United States and the
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil issued a Joint
Statement on “Patent work sharing between Patent Offices.”4 This
Joint Statement recognizes that work sharing between the two offices may serve as “a driving force for improving patent quality and
facilitating the examination process of patent applications.”5 In a
Joint Communique that same day, United States President Barack
Obama and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff expressed their satisfaction with the completion of the Joint Statement between the two
national patent offices “in order to improve efficiencies in the patent

1

Associação Brasileira de Propriedade Intelectual, Propostas para a
Inovação e a Propriedade Intelectual. Vol. 1. Fatores de Crescimento Econômico,
Competitividade Industrial e Atração de Investimentos, ABPI at 16 (Sept. 2014),
http://www.abpi.org.br/materiais/diversos/volumes1e2propinovacaepi.zip
[hereinafter ABPI].
2
ABPI, supra note 1 at 16.
3
U.S.-Braz., Joint Statement Between the Government of the United States
and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil on Patent Work Sharing
Between Offices (June 30, 2015), available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/VI.%20U.S.-Brazil%20Joint%20Statement%20on%20Patent%
20Work%20Sharing.pdf [hereinafter Joint Statement].
4
Id.
5
Id.
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registration process.”6 Five months later, on November 24, 2015, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and the National Institute of Industrial Property of Brazil (“INPI”) announced
a Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program (“PPH Pilot Program”).7 The PPH Pilot Program commenced on January 11, 2016,
and it is the first step towards the realization of patent work sharing
between the two countries.8
This article analyzes the implications of patent work sharing
programs between Brazil and the United States, such as the PPH
Pilot Program. Part I has introduced the problem, and argues that
such work sharing could provide a potential solution to Brazil’s desire of attracting investment from companies that demand patent
protection as a pre-requisite, while still reducing its patent prosecution backlog. Part II describes how a properly operational patent system can grow the Brazilian economy, increase industrial competitiveness, and attract investments. In addition, it discusses how the
current patent prosecution backlog is the system’s main roadblock.
Part III examines the Joint Statement issued by the United States and
Brazil on patent work sharing, discusses what Patent Prosecution
Highway (“PPH”) implementations of such patent work sharing programs generally look like, and examines the PPH pilot program created between the United States and Brazil. Finally, Part IV puts forward the proposition that a properly implemented patent work sharing program could be the answer to Brazil’s patent protection and
economic goals, while at the same time addressing its backlog problem. At the same time, the analysis highlights the challenges Brazil
must face in order to achieve this result.

6

Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Communique by President Barack
Obama and President Dilma Rousseff, THE WHITE HOUSE, at 1-2 (June 30, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/joint-communique-pre
sident-barack-obama-and-president-dilma-rousseff [hereinafter White House
Joint Communique].
7
U.S.-Braz., Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the National Institute of Industrial Property of Brazil on A Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program (Nov. 24, 2015), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PPH_MOU_and_Workplan_
USPTO-INPI.pdf. [hereinafter MOU].
8
Id. at 3.
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II. BRAZIL’S STRIVE TO A FUNCTIONAL PATENT SYSTEM
A. The Patent System as a Means to Economic Growth
It is a widespread theory in developed countries such as the
United States that a patent system drives innovation, research, and
product development.9 During recent years, President Obama invested in the United States Patent System through initiatives of patent prosecution speed and quality improvements, aimed to “accelerate innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic growth” in the
United States.10 However, despite this strong consensus, evidence
of a patent system as a means to economic growth has yet to be sufficiently established.11 For example, a study of Japan’s expansion of
its patent rights system in 1988 did not prove to have any measurable
effect on either innovation or research and development.12 The study
tried unsuccessfully to measure the relative contribution of different
patents in relation to technological progress.13 Additionally, patents
may serve as a means to hinder innovation of others, such as in cases
of defensive and suppressive strategic patent behaviors, where a
leading company may patent an invention only as a means of discouraging competitive innovation.14 Nevertheless, there is another
strong economic argument for the creation of a patent system: to
discourage trade secret laws and behaviors.15

9
National Economic Council, Council of Economic Advisers, and Office of
Science and Technology Policy, A Strategy for American Innovation: Securing
Our Economic Growth and Prosperity 3 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.w
hitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/InnovationStrategy.pdf (quoting President Obama’s statement that “[t]he key to our success . . . will be to compete by
developing new products, by generating new industries, by maintaining our role
as the world’s engine of scientific discovery and technological innovation.” Further noting that “we must also commit to making the necessary public investments
to support high-quality patent examination.”).
10
Id. at 22.
11
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 325 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003) (discussing
whether more patents mean more and better innovation).
12
Id. at 326.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 321.
15
Id. at 330.
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A strong argument made for the existence of a patent system is
that a working patent system may curb the economic problems created by trade secrets and economic monopolies.16 Under this theory,
if inventors are not awarded patent protection upon disclosure of
their inventions, they would instead maintain their competitive advantage through trade secrecy.17 This trade secrecy would affect various aspects of the economy through undesirable business behaviors. The first undesirable outcome of this is that research and development would remain focused only on inventions that could successfully be kept secret and, therefore, profitable.18 This means inventions that can be easily reverse engineered, or easily reproducible, would likely see a decrease in investment.19
Another undesirable outcome of a lack of patent protection
would be decreased efficiency in manufacturing. “The possessor of
a secret process for manufacturing a product might not be the most
efficient manufacturer of that product.”20 The highest output efficiency in this situation is to make available the secret process to the
most efficient manufacturer.21 Without a patent system, however,
this is not easily accomplished without a likely loss of rights to the
invention.22 This also has a compounding effect of keeping secret a
manufacturing process that may also serve to drive efficient manufacturing in other industries and other products.23 The contemplated
solution of licensing the manufacturing trade secret, among other
types of trade secrets, is costly due to its high probability of leak and
high transaction costs.24 Lastly, an economy lacking a patent system
may be at an increased risk of creating lasting monopolies due to an
established firm’s product, superior efficiency, or economics of
scale.25 The patent system may help smaller firms and individual

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 328.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 329.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 329.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 330.
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inventors pierce through established monopolies while securing
rights to their innovative work.26
Whether the patent system directly drives economic growth
through the incentivizing of innovation, or through discouraging of
economic problems created by trade secrecy and economic monopolies, developed countries such as the United States are convinced
that properly implemented patent protection has a positive impact
on the future of its economy.27 Yet, even after decades of intellectual
property growth, studies show that developed countries still struggle
to establish direct correlations and measurements between a patent
system and its effects to innovation and the economy in general.28
The current view is still that “IP studies have far to go before we can
even hope for consensus about the proper bounds of evidence-based
intellectual property.”29 This may serve as a further explanation of
the difference in existing worldwide implementations of patent protection laws.
For developing countries such as Brazil, the benefits of a patent
system mimic the ones of developed countries, but with certain differences. The ABPI believes that the published patent itself, with its
detailed written description, is already an enormous benefit to others
who want to develop the same technology.30 It further notes that the
patent system promotes economic and social developments not only
in technological areas but also in scientific ones.31 The ABPI believes the patent system is fundamentally an instrument that functions to stimulate and drive industries of research and development.32 In addition, for areas such as the pharmaceutical industry, it
means market availability of medicine to a society that would otherwise not have access to it without patent protection.33 Further-

26

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 330.
See National Economic Council, supra note 9, at 1, 69.
28
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11, at 331.
29
John M. Golden, Robert P. Merges & Pamela Samuelson, The Path of IP
Studies: Growth, Diversification, and Hope, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1757, 1768 (2014)
(concluding that the article is only a stepping stone into further work to establish
such an evidentiary-based IP system).
30
ABPI, supra note 1, at 16.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
27
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more, the ABPI reports that the availability of legal resources created from patent protection decreases the risk that intellectual property will be lost, and consequently increases local manufacturing of
products.34 This drives the creation of local jobs and strengthens the
local economy.35 In summary, developing countries that provide intellectual property protection are better suited to reap the benefits of
new worldwide technology, medicine, and cutting edge manufacturing.
Brazil’s intellectual property laws already exist and are able to
protect inventors and companies that want to invest in research and
development in the country.36 The laws appropriately award patent
owners with temporary rights to exclude others from their inventions, as long as patents are narrowly limited to the scope of their
written specification.37 However, the inability of applicants to secure a patent in Brazil within a meaningful length of time causes a
roadblock to reaping the benefits of the available patent protection.38
At bottom, the question as to whether a patent system is a driver
of economic growth is up for debate. However, the Brazilian Government believes that a functioning patent system is vital to its domestic investments and economic growth, and this paper will assume the same.39 What is not debatable is that a patent system with
an eleven-year backlog must be revised.
B. Brazil’s Patent Backlog Problem
Brazil has an elephant in the room gaining a lot of attention: the
backlog. In 2003, the average time to secure a patent in Brazil was
relatively slow, about six years.40 This increased to about nine years
in 2009 and is now at an astonishing eleven years.41 In comparison,
the average time to secure a patent in the United States is just over
34

Id.
ABPI, supra note 1, at 16.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. (discussing the backlog problem).
39
Id. (discussing how a patent system helps to drive its domestic economy).
40
Associação Brasileira da Propriedade Intelectual, País demora 11 anos
para aprovar patentes, BOLETIM DA ABPI NUM. 147 at 4 (May 25, 2015),
available at http://www.abpi.org.br/materiais/boletim/Bol147.pdf.
41
Id.
35
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two years, and about three years in both Colombia and Peru.42 The
United States recognized that a patent system with a large backlog
may stall innovation and impede economic growth, and it is working
to reduce what it refers to as its current “enormous” two-year patent
prosecution backlog.43 In comparison, Brazil has a lot more work to
do. The Brazilian eleven-year backlog currently renders its patent
system practically inoperable, especially in areas of technology that
can become quickly obsolete post invention, such as in communications and computer technology industries.44
The result of the backlog problem is that Brazil only has a patent
system in theory, but not in practice. This diminishes Brazil’s image
as a country that is able to handle the intellectual property protection
needs of international investors, and brings uncertainty to both international and national patent applicants. This creates a roadblock
for companies that want to do business in Brazil but are not willing
to enter the country without meaningful intellectual property protection.
The current situation is largely due to the lack of patent examiners in the Brazil’s National Institute of Industrial Property (“INPI”),
the government agency in charge of examining and issuing patents.45 In 2014, the INPI employed 192 patent examiners who were
in charge of handling its backlog of 184,224 patents that year, which
yields about 980 patents per examiner.46 In comparison, in 2012 the
United States employed 7,831 patent examiners to handle its
603,898 patents that year, yielding only about 77 patents per examiner.47 The bottom line is that there are not enough patent examiners
employed in Brazil to handle the current backlog, and the problem
is only getting worse.
Brazil has recognized the issue. It is working to address this
problem by hiring more patent examiners and undergoing a revamp42

Id.
National Economic Council, supra note 9, at 2 (describing new initiatives
driven by the Obama administration and the U.S. Department of Commerce to
improve the United States “enormous” backlog).
44
Associação Brasileira da Propriedade Intelectual, supra note 40; ABPI,
supra note 1, at 16-17.
45
ABPI, supra note 1, at 17.
46
Id.
47
Id.
43
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ing of the country’s public structure, expecting to hire 150 more examiners per year until 2018.48 The President of the INPI, Luiz Otavio Pimentel, recognized that, in regards to patent protection in the
country, “[t]he worst thing [Brazil] faces is a backlog.”49 However,
hiring takes time and money, and Pimentel also recognized that Brazil is currently in a difficult economic situation.50 This grim economic situation in Brazil has the effect of “a reduction in expenses
for public institutions [including the] INPI.”51
Nevertheless, the country is still interested in assuring its commitment to a viable patent system and to protecting intellectual property in the country. Through it, Brazil aspires to stimulate competitiveness and innovation in the country and the internationalization
of its economy.52
III. PATENT WORK SHARING
A. The Patent Work Sharing Joint-Statement
On June 30, 2015, the United States Department of Commerce
and Brazil’s Ministry for Development, Industry and Foreign Trade
signed a Joint Statement on “Patent Work Sharing Between Patent
Offices” of both countries.53 The Joint Statement details how the
two countries reached a common understanding, and proposes a
common goal.54 The countries considered “the value and the importance of increasing collaborative efforts between the respective
patent offices, recognizing that work sharing . . . may serve as a

48

Id. at 18.
James Nurton, Managing Intellectual Property: Patent Office views from
Brazil, Europe and Japan, EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PLC at 13
(Oct. 14, 2015) (describing the 2015 International Association for the Protection
of Intellectual Property Congress lunch panel, featured differing perspectives on
“continuous improvement of IP systems,” and attended by representatives from
the Brazil, Europe, and Japan patent offices).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Associação Brasileira da Propriedade Intelectual, supra note 40.
53
Joint Statement, supra note 3.
54
Id.
49
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driving force for improving patent quality and facilitating the examination of patent applications.”55 The countries acknowledged that
patent work sharing “may contribute to promotion of innovation and
investment in [their] economies,” empowering businesses to grow
and expand their markets across borders.56 The outcome of the Joint
Statement is an endeavor to “explore patent work sharing arrangements in the short term” via a common understanding:
The patent offices of the two Governments intend to
commence cooperative activities, on or after the date
of signature of [the] Joint Statement, including the
implementation of a mutually beneficial work sharing pilot program that facilitates the examination of
patent applications that are commonly filed in the
United States and Brazil.57
On that same day, U.S. President Obama and Brazilian President
Rousseff issued a Joint Communique on their determination to
“strengthen an increasingly diversified and mature partnership . . .
and [to] focus on meeting the needs and aspirations of the societies
of the two largest democracies and economies in the Americas.”58
The presidents emphasized the important role of bilateral coordination and dialogue and, on the topic of expanding trade and investment cooperation, expressed their satisfaction with the completion
of the Joint Statement between the two national patent offices “in
order to improve efficiencies in the patent registration process.”59
The Joint Statement highlights that it “does not create any legal
obligations under international or domestic law.” 60 While this is
generally true, the Joint Statement does fall within the international
law category of soft law–the document is still considered international law and should not be viewed as simply aspirational. Soft law
generally describes non-legally binding international instruments

55
56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
Id.
White House Joint Communique, supra note 6.
Id.
Joint Statement, supra note 3.
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that the parties hope will achieve general or universal application.61
These instruments can represent an interim step in treaty making,
even if they do not come to fruition.62 In this case, the Joint Statement opened the door for the respective countries’ patent prosecution offices to reach an agreement on how they can implement a patent work sharing program.
Soon after, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) and the National Institute of Industrial Property of Brazil (“INPI”) announced a Patent Prosecution Highway Pilot Program
(“PPH Pilot Program”).63 Before discussing the details of how the
PPH Pilot Program was executed, we must understand the context
in which it is to be implemented.
B. The Patent Prosecution Highway (“PPH”)
To understand how patent work sharing agreements work, we
can look to the most widely used program today, the Patent Prosecution Highway.64 The Patent Prosecution Highway (“PPH”) is a
decision-sharing framework in which two different patent granting
agencies create an agreement that work generated by a first patent
office is later shared with a second patent office.65 The USPTO and
the Japan Patent Office were the first patent granting agencies to
enter into such an agreement in July 2006, and since then many
countries have followed suit.66
PPH agreements initially existed as bilateral agreements between two patent offices, allowing an applicant whose invention
claims have been determined to be patentable in an initial country’s

61

ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 49 (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2013).
62
Id. at 50.
63
MOU, supra note 7.
64
Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) - Fast Track Examination of Applications, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/
patents-getting-started/international-protection/patent-prosecution-highway-pphfast-track (last modified Oct. 17, 2016) [hereinafter USPTO PPH Fast Track].
65
John M. Carson, Alan Kessler & Hugh Dunlop, A Practical Guide to The
Patent Prosecution Highway, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Apr. 1,
2009), http://www.managingip.com/Article/2167622/A-practical-guide-to-the-pa
tent-prosecution-highway.html.
66
Id.
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patent filing office, the Office of First Filing, to go through an accelerated examination in a subsequent country’s patent filing office,
the Office of Second Filing.67 In addition, multilateral PPH agreements, such as the Global and IP5 PPH programs, have seen increased participation by countries around the world, with the Global
PPH reaching twenty-one member countries as of July 2015.68 Multilateral agreements allow patent applicants to designate any of the
member countries’ patent offices as the Office of First Filing or the
Office of Second Filing, allowing an applicant the flexibility to request accelerated examination at any, and all, of the member offices,
once an Office of First Filing has determined the invention claims
to be patentable.69 The ultimate goal of these agreements is faster
and more efficient worldwide patent prosecution. According to statistical data from patent offices that implement PPH agreements,
those offices have increased efficiency, and accomplished this
goal.70
The way PPH programs increase efficiency is by reducing the
amount of redundancy in the prosecution of patent applications filed
in multiple patent offices around the world.71 This redundancy exists
largely due to differences in standards of patentability in different
countries’ patent laws.72 Patent offices cannot “grant each other’s
work ‘full faith and credit,’ without harmonizing their statutes.”73
Therefore, the work done by patent examiners of ensuring that the
granting of patents adheres to the country’s patent law is largely redone, even when the outcome is substantially the same.74 Such work
includes time-consuming research, such as making sure inventions
are novel and non-obvious, in light of prior art.
Properly implemented PPH agreements reduce redundancy in
the work done by patent examiners.75 First, the patent reaches the
67

USPTO PPH Fast Track, supra note 64.
Global Patent Prosecution Highway simplifies existing network, JAPAN
PATENT OFFICE (July 6, 2015), https://www.jpo.go.jp/ppph-portal/globalpph.htm.
69
Id.
70
Patent Prosecution Highway Portal Site Statistics, JAPAN PATENT OFFICE,
https://www.jpo.go.jp/ppph-portal/statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
71
Carson, supra note 65.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
68
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second country’s patent examiner in a cleaner state, after having
gone through a full round of examination including any amendments
to the specification, drawings, or claims, in order to become patent
eligible in the first country.76 Second, when a patent examiner in the
second country understands how a patent examiner in the first country has conducted his or her work to ensure patentability, the examiner in the second country can start his or her work, starting from
where the first examiner left off.77 This is because the second examiner can rely on the examination already done, and only looks at any
material that the first examiner did not consider, due to the differences in the countries’ patentability laws.78 However, dissecting
these differences is a challenging task, and PPH agreements work
only if the legal frameworks of patent laws between the countries in
the agreement share significant commonality. Only then can the second office dramatically reduce the need for further examination.
Due to the rise of the global economy, and the growth of intellectual property as a global trade, the desire to align domestic patent
laws of different countries has grown significantly in the past two
centuries. 79 The Trade Related International Property Agreement
(“TRIPS”), passed in 1994, marked a turning point in recent phases
of development concerning proposals to harmonize domestic patent
laws at the international level.80 The agreement laid down substantive principles that applied to all members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and signaled “the inevitability of a more harmonized and strong global patent system.”81 Successful PPH implementations are best evidenced in countries that share substantive patent law, creating huge benefits.82 Japan and Korea provide good
76

Carson, supra note 65.
Id.
78
Id.
79
David Kappos, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Address at the
Managing IP International Patent Forum: A Global Call for Harmonization,
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.u
spto.gov/news/speeches/2011/kapposlondon.jsp.
80
Dongwook Chun, Patent Law Harmonization in the Age of Globalization:
The Necessity and Strategy for a Pragmatic Outcome, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMA
RK OFF. SOC’Y 127, 129 (2011).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 153; Etienne De Villiers, The Patent Prosecution Highway: Canada
as Office of First Filing, 2 LANDSLIDE 30, 31 (2010).
77
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examples—the substantive patent law is almost identical in those
countries. In the United States and Canada, patent laws grew from
similar principles.83 Therefore, Brazil can only successfully reap the
benefits of a Patent Prosecution Highway agreement with the United
States if its patent laws are at least substantially comparable to the
U.S. patent laws.
C. The Established USPTO-INPI PPH Pilot Program
On November 23, 2015, the USPTO and the INPI signed a
Memorandum of Understanding creating a PPH pilot program “as
contemplated in the June 30, 2015 Joint Statement between the
United States Government and the Government of Brazil.”84 Although limited, the pilot program is the first realization of the aspirations set forth by the Government of Brazil to change its patent
system in attempts to promote innovation and cross-country investment in its economy.
The PPH Pilot Program, which launched on January 11, 2016,
functions as a limited pilot for commencing cooperation between the
patent offices of both countries.85 At the same time, the program is
aimed to encourage cooperation of patent work sharing between the
two offices, while still allowing for complete liberty of office-specific guidelines.86 This includes the liberty of both offices “to reflect
their respective legal terminology and processes,” and to allow additional flexibility beyond the core requirements.87 This results in
the ability of each office to fully determine how much work, or how
little work, to leverage from the Office of First Filing, without any
minimum requirements.88 As usual of a PPH program, the ultimate
decision of patentability remains at the sole discretion of the Office
of Second Filing, in accordance to its national laws.89

83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Chun, supra note 80, at 154; De Villiers, supra note 82, at 31.
MOU, supra note 7, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 3.
MOU, supra note 7, at 3.
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The extent of the program will be limited, allowing only up to
150 patents to enter the program during its two-year maximum period.90 In 2014, this would mark only a small percentage (roughly
5%) of the 2,749 patents granted in Brazil that year, and an even
smaller percentage (roughly 0.5%) of the 30,342 patents that were
filed that year.91 Although the USPTO is free to accept any application where the INPI was the Office of First Filing, the INPI will
conversely accept PPH applications only where the USPTO was the
Office of First Filing to recent or newly filed utility applications in
the field of oil, gas, or petrochemical inventions.92 On August 25,
2016, seven months into implementation, the INPI had accepted
twenty-two patent applications under the PPH pilot program, with
an average time to reach a decision of patentability from initial request at just 117 days, a promising number.93 Yet, this small number
of applicants at seven months after the program’s introduction, highlights its limited accessibility.
The PPH Pilot Program, however limited, still has the potential
to become a historical turning point in Brazil’s strive to become a
meaningful player of global intellectual property protection. The Pilot Program highlights its intended plan to be evaluated upon its conclusion for “efficiency, efficacy, and effectiveness.”94 This entails
analyzing the results obtained by all applications processed by the
program for measurements that can gauge its success.95 Such measurements would include comparing the time to grant a patent within
the program with the time to grant a similar patent outside the program.
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The program’s success will likely depend on whether the pilot
program, like any other such subsequent patent work sharing program, is positioned to take significant advantages of similarities between the two countries’ domestic patent laws.
IV. PATENT WORK SHARING AS A SOLUTION TO BRAZIL’S PATENT
INDUSTRY GROWTH ASPIRATIONS
Patent work sharing programs, such as the new USPTO-INPI
PPH Pilot Program, may provide a new avenue for applicants seeking patent protection in Brazil. This new avenue may serve as the
solution to the Brazilian Government’s desire to grow its national
economy, increase industry competitiveness, and attract investments through an operational patent system.96 There are fears that
such programs may hurt Brazil’s current patent backlog, due to these
programs opening the doors to an expedited track for a significant
amount of foreign patent filers.97 However, if properly implemented, it is possible for Brazil not only to open those doors and
increase the number of annual patent grants, but also to help decrease its backlog.
A. Patent Work Sharing as a Fast-Lane to Patent Examinations
The main benefit of patent work sharing programs is their potential of increasing efficiency in the patent examination process.98
This increased efficiency comes from the potential decrease in time
it takes for a patent examiner in the Office of Second Filing to reach
a final decision as to granting or denying a patent, when such patent
has already been granted in another country’s Office of First Filing.99 The improvements in patent examination speed are directly
proportionate to two factors: 1) the differences in the domestic patent law between the countries participating in the patent work shar-
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ing program, and 2) how much credibility the second country’s filing office is willing to give to the already produced work of the first
country’s filing office.100
Extreme examples of both factors illustrate the possibilities for
speed improvement of patent work sharing. First, when the domestic
patent laws between participating countries are distinct, any examination work completed in a country’s Office of First Filing would
have no bearing on the examination work that still must be done at
any subsequent country’s filing office. Second, even when the first
factor is met, if a country’s Office of Second Filing does not give
any faith and credit to the previous examination work performed in
the first country’s filing office, there is no opportunity of efficiency
improvement in the Office of Second Filing’s patent examination.
In either of these scenarios, the time it takes to get a patent filed in
the Office of Second Filing is exactly the same regardless of whether
or not the patent is part of the patent work sharing program.
At the same time, if a country shares the same patent laws as
another, the Office of Second Filing may potentially reduce the time
it takes to examine a patent to virtually nothing. This will depend on
how much faith and credit the Office of Second Filing gives to the
work performed by the Office of First Filing during its patent examination. This is possible because there would be no new work to be
done by the Office of Second Filing; all of the examination effort is
applicable and has already been completed by the Office of First
Filing. Therefore, when a country shares the patent laws of the first
examining country and gives complete trust to the work already
completed by that country’s examiners, a patent work sharing agreement creates an opportunity for full efficiency of the second country’s examination process.
There is an important implication of this described scenario of
absolute patent work sharing efficiency. Under this scenario, apart
from insignificant transaction costs, the time to get a patent for a
new invention in the second country will never be greater than the
same time it takes to get a patent in the first country. This remains
true regardless of the second country’s examination time and remains possible irrespectively of any existing backlog. This is possible because an applicant who wants patent protection is able to file
100
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for a patent simultaneously in both countries, and once the patent is
granted in the country where examination is the fastest, the applicant
could then immediately apply to enter expedited prosecution—for
example, through a patent prosecution highway application—in the
country with slower patent examination. In the scenario where the
slower country—that would become the country with the Office of
Second Filing—has equal domestic patent laws and gives full faith
and credit to the examination of the faster country—which becomes
the country with the Office of First Filing—the patent would be immediately approved, as there is no more work to do.
The two factors highlighted above currently drive the success of
patent work sharing programs around the globe. The most prominent
example of how a patent work sharing agreement can have a significant effect is the PPH program between Japan and Korea. 101 Because the patent laws in Japan and Korea are substantially the same,
an applicant with a previously issued patent in Japan has been able
to obtain a patent in Korea in only 28 days.102 Still, such a successful
result can be obtained only when both factors described can be met
to a significant extent. Due in part to the disagreement between
countries and scholars on how patent laws drive economic growth,
and which issues of patentability are better aligned with a country’s
goal, worldwide patent laws can be significantly misaligned.103
The PPH agreement between the United States and Canada provides an example of a more typical and successful patent work sharing program. In 2010, Canada’s Patent Office was marketed as an
Office of First Filing for applicants who were interested in the quickest road to a patent in the United States. 104 This push noted the similarities between the two countries in not only their language, but
also in their domestic patent laws.105
Canada incentivized its patent office as an Office of First Filing
because it allows applicants to pay for expedited examination
101
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through a special provision of the Canadian Patent Rules.106
Through this route, a patent would be examined in Canada in as little
as four weeks, and it was common for an applicant to receive a grant
in as little as eighteen months from initial filing.107 The applicant
could then use this allowance as the basis to expedite a patent application of the same invention in the United States, resulting in a
United States-issued patent in less than two years: a 30-50% time
savings from the 35.3-month average at the time.108
David Kappos, the Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and the Director of the USPTO, dubbed this strategic patent
route “Toronto Pronto.”109 Patent applications filed through the Toronto Pronto strategy were known to receive United States grants in
less than a year in some cases, a significant reduction in examination
time in comparison to traditional filings at the USPTO at the time.110
Concurrently, the Canadian PPH fast lane was also available as an
expedited path for patents filed first in the United States, with the
Canadian office as the Office of Second Filing. 111 The average pendency from PPH requests in Canada to a final decision averaged
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only 5.4 months in 2014.112 This examination time was also considerably shorter than the 32.9-month average pendency of non-PPH
Canadian patent applications filed in that same period.113
The success of the PPH path between Canada and the United
States, and vice-versa, is only possible because Canada and the
United States share a similar legal framework.114 Claims drafted for
the United States are generally also allowable in Canada provided
that they meet the similar U.S. patent law requirements of subject
matter, novelty, and obviousness.115 The main caveat to using Toronto Pronto is making sure that the claims sought are allowable
subject matter in Canada.116 General categories of non-patentable
subject matter include “mathematical formulae or ‘mere’ discoveries, methods of medical treatment, higher life forms, business
schemes, methods of playing an existing game, and professional
skill/judgment.”117 However, the United States has some of the
broadest scope of patentable subject matters compared with other
jurisdictions, meaning that some of its patentable inventions may
not be patentable elsewhere.118
B. Comparison of the Patent Laws of the U.S. and Brazil
The United States and Brazil domestic patent laws share many
substantive views on what constitutes a patentable invention.119 Brazil has implemented patent laws that comply with the Trade Related
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement, as
adopted by the World Trade Organization.120 Brazil has adhered to
112
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TRIPS requirements in its patent laws and has introduced patent protections for both pharmaceutical products and processes.121 The Brazilian patent law also includes similar bars to patentability such as
lack of novelty and inventive step.122 The most common grounds for
invalidity include lack of enablement and lack of support in the specifications.123 Under Brazil’s patent law, Article 24 describes lack of
enablement and best mode requirement as:
. . . [T]he specification must describe the subject
matter clearly and sufficiently so as to enable a person skilled in the art to carry it out and to indicate,
when applicable, the best mode of execution.124
Article 25 describes lack of support in the specifications as:
. . . [T]he claims must be based on the specification,
characterizing the particulars of the application and
defining clearly and precisely the subject matter to
be protected.125
The United States also enforces that patents satisfy the enablement, best mode, and support in the specification requirements in its
laws.126 Under U.S. law, lack of enablement and best mode are enforced by the requirement that:
The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
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forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or
joint inventor of carrying out the invention.127
In addition, similar specification support enforces that:
The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint
inventor regards as the invention.128
These texts demonstrate some strikingly similarities between the
domestic patent laws of both countries. However, Brazilian’s patent
law is not as broad as the United States’ patent laws when it comes
to patentable subject matter. In the United States, a claim that falls
within one of the four enumerated categories of patentable subject
matter recited in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) is still not patentable if the claims
are directed to nothing more than abstract ideas (such as mathematical algorithms), natural phenomena, and laws of nature.129 In addition, judicially recognized exceptions have been described using
various other terms, including “physical phenomena,” “scientific
principles,” “systems that depend on human intelligence alone,”
“disembodied concepts,” “mental processes” and “disembodied
mathematical algorithms and formulas.”130
In comparison, Brazil includes a much wider array of unpatentable subject matters.131 According to Article 10 of Brazil’s Patent
Law, all of the following are not patentable:
I. discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical
methods; II. purely abstract concepts; III. schemes,
plans, principles or methods for commerce, accounting, financing, education, advertising, lottery and
control; IV. literary, architectural, artistic and scientific works, or any aesthetic creation; V. computer
programmes per se; VI. presentations of information;
127
128
129
130
131
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VII. rules of a game; VIII. operating or surgical techniques and methods, as well as therapeutic or diagnostic methods for the treatment of humans or animals; and IX. the whole or part of natural living beings and biological material found in nature or also
isolated therefrom, including the genome or
germplasm of any natural living being and he natural
biological processes.132
In addition, Article 18 also provides that the following are not
patentable:
I. that which is contrary to [accepted principles of]
morality and good conduct and to public safety, order
and health; II. substances, matter, mixtures, elements
or products of any kind, as well as any modification
of their physical-chemical properties and the respective processes of obtaining or modifying them, when
they result from the transformation of the atomic nucleus; and III. The hole or part of living beings, except transgenic microorganisms which meet the three
requirements for patentability - novelty, inventive
step and industrial application - specified in Article 8
and which are not mere discoveries.133
The result is a mixed bag, the striking differences between patentable subject matters in Brazil versus the United States likely
mean that the potential for a patent work sharing program varies
largely by industry. For example, the pharmaceutical industry may
not be able to take advantage of a patent work sharing program as
successfully as the communication technology industry, due to Brazil’s requirement that a patent must withstand acceptable principles
of “morality and good conduct and to public safety, order and
health.”134 Brazil’s public health oriented, TRIPS-compliant approach to patent laws in relation to pharmaceuticals, has created a
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balance within its intellectual property regime between pharmaceutical innovation and access to medicines.135 Although a positive approach for Brazil to provide affordability to healthcare in the country, this creates a unique set of domestic laws in comparison with
the United States, and could therefore be an industry where a patent
work sharing program would be unable to excel.
In addition to statutory text comparison, Brazil will have to
study and keep up to date with the ever-changing jurisdiction interpretation of United States patent laws. For example, The Supreme
Court has changed the interpretation of the definiteness statutory requirement to patentability in 2014, in the case of Nautilus, Inc. v.
Boisig Instruments, Inc.136 The United States Federal Code statutory
language requires that a patent specification “conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the
invention.”137 Prior to the case, United States Federal Courts enforced that a patent claim could only be considered legally indefinite, and therefore unpatentable, when it was “insolubly ambiguous”—just short of ambiguous.138 The Supreme Court concluded
that this standard did not satisfy the statutory requirements, and in
place of the “insolubly ambiguous” standard, held that a patent is
invalid for indefiniteness “if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the
scope of the invention.”139 These two interpretations of patentability
flow from an unchanged statutory text, and highlight the difficult
task Brazil must face to establish an efficient patent work sharing
program.
Nevertheless, once a patent avoids the hurdle of being a patentable subject matter in Brazil, and other potential differentiating factors, there is great potential for the substantial examination in Brazil
to share significant similarities with the examination of the same patent in the United States. In addition, patent laws are not static, and
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there is current aspiration and tendency for global patent laws to
converge even further in the future.140
C. Implementation as the Key to Success
Once a patentable invention is identified as patentable subject
matter in both countries, the focus will turn to how much credibility
the country’s Office of Second Filing is willing to give to the first
country’s Office of First Filing prior work.
In a future patent work sharing agreement between the United
States and Brazil, the most common scenario would be for a patent
to be granted first in the United States and then subsequently requested to move to the fast lane in Brazil. This means the USPTO
would become the Office of First Filing and the INPI the Office of
Second Filing. Therefore, it will be up to INPI as Brazil’s patent
office to decide how much credit to give to the work already performed at the USPTO, having a direct impact on the ultimate success
of the patent work sharing program.
In typical patent work sharing agreements, the local patent office
makes the ultimate determination of what is patentable.141 This
means that how Brazil chooses to implement its phase of the PPH
Pilot Program, or any other patent work sharing program in the future, will have a great impact on the time efficiencies during Brazil’s
patent examination stage as the Office of Second Filing. Brazil must
conduct a careful comparative analysis of patentability laws between itself and the United States, identifying all intricate scenarios
where a patent would be granted in the United States but not in Brazil. The USPTO office has vowed to help Brazil in this effort, but
Brazil will still need to make a significant investment if it wants such
programs to succeed.142
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Once the key differences and similarities of domestic patent
laws are identified, Brazil can implement a domestic examination as
the Office of Second Filing that focuses only on the extra steps necessary to also grant the same patent in Brazil. In addition, Brazil will
need to give full faith and credit to the work already done by its peers
at the USPTO and take their prior examination at face value.
For example, one of the first steps to patent examination after
identifying the invention is conducting what is known as a “Search
of Prior Art.”143 This involves conducting a thorough search of all
domestic and foreign patents, publications, and other relevant prior
art.144 Conducting a search of prior art can be a time consuming process.145 This work would already have been completed by the
USPTO as the Office of First Filing and reducing its redundancy
would be key to lowering Brazil’s examination time.146
The next steps the USPTO does after identifying the prior art is
to apply its domestic patent laws to determine patentability in relation to the prior art.147 This includes several steps: a determination
of patentable subject matter; an analysis of adequacy in specification
and claims, including enablement and best mode requirements; and
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the finding of whether the requirements of novelty and non-obviousness have been met.148 As previously discussed, there is also opportunity for efficiency in this phase, through the proper identification of what relevant work would already have been done at the
USPTO, and a focus only to the exceptions.
Therefore, the amount of time savings of a patent work sharing
program between the United States and Brazil will be impacted by
not only how much trust the INPI gives to the work done at the
USPTO, but also how much investment the INPI makes to streamline the productivity of Office of Second Filing’s patent examinations.
Consequently, the priority it gives to examinations as an Office
of Second Filing in comparison to its standard examinations will
also have a tremendous impact due to the current backlog. The INPI
would need to prioritize examination of patents that are part of the
patent work sharing program or they will face the same fate of existing patents in the system. However, this ultimately raises the
question as to how a patent work sharing agreement may affect the
existing patent backlog problem.
D. Outsourcing The Backlog Problem
Brazil is faced with the challenging question of how many resources to dedicate to the success of a patent work sharing program,
when it is already facing a significant backlog of work. There is concern that a patent work sharing program will never be successful
until the INPI first addresses the backlog, because “there would not
be enough patent examiners to cope with the avalanche of expedited
examination cases.”149 The concern is rooted in the current workforce of examiners at the INPI, concluding that prior to the successful implementation of a patent work sharing program, the INPI
would need to increase substantially the number of examiners.150
This concern is sincere, but misguided. A patent work sharing
program will not open the doors to expedited examinations to the
detriment to Brazil’s already unmanageable backlog problem. Although accurate that a successful expedited path to a Brazilian patent
148
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has the potential to significantly increase the number of patents currently filed at the INPI, it would also cause a significant decrease in
patents filed at the INPI via the traditional route of initially filing
and prosecuting in Brazil.
A decrease in traditional patent filings is possible due to the potential of an enormous time saving in obtaining a patent via an expedited route, such as a PPH route. The number of patents filed in
Brazil by non-resident applicants continues to grow.151 In 2014, out
of the 32,395 patent applications, only 14% of them were made by
Brazilian residents.152 Foreign patent filers will already be inclined
to take advantage of an expedited route to a Brazilian patent, as they
may already be familiar with patent filings in multiple offices.
Therefore, if the INPI is successful in its investment to properly implement a program that yields significant time saving in the expedited route, this would cause a large shift in patent filings to that
route, thus decreasing the number of patents filed done in the traditional, slower route.
Patents currently sitting in the backlog may also benefit from a
successfully implemented expedited route. If one looks at the cumulative period of 2003-2014, which make up the majority of patents
in the current eleven-year backlog, the current percentage of resident
patents is only about 22%.153 This means that most patents sitting in
the backlog right now are from foreign patent applicants, many
which may have the same patent already granted in the United States
and could immediately qualify for a more broadly implemented patent work sharing program.
Although the overall number of patents filed in Brazil may increase, if Brazil reaches the level of patent work sharing success that
gave rise to the Toronto Pronto, it would yield as much as 70% savings in time. Brazil would grant patents through such an expedited
program in only 40.7 months—about three years—instead of the
current eleven years for a traditional filing.154 This result is calculated by adding the current 35.3-month average time it takes to get
151
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a patent in the United States, to the average 5.4-month pendency
realized in Canada from PPH requests to a final decision.155 Yet, this
might be an aggressive goal for Brazil to achieve.
The 35.3-month timeframe is the average amount of time it currently takes to get a patent in the United States today, and is not
something that Brazil has any control over. Additionally, the 5.4month pendency realized in the Toronto Pronto scenario would be
difficult for Brazil to duplicate. Canada enjoyed particular advantages as an Office of Second Filing when it entered a patent work
sharing program with the United States: a similar legal framework;
a shared language, giving way to English claims and examination;
and an existing familiarity with the U.S. law and USPTO procedures.156 Nevertheless, the potential in economic and temporal savings are so significant that even if Brazil’s Office of Second Filing
examination time is one year—more than double the time achieved
by Canada—such a program would still yield a 64% savings in time
over traditional filing, with a patent granted in a total of four years
as opposed to eleven.
In such a scenario, it’s also important to note that the majority
of the examination is actually being done by the USPTO in the
United States and not the INPI in Brazil. This includes the time consuming prior art search and initial patentability determination. Considering the high number of patent filings in Brazil from foreign entities, this means that nearly 85% of new patent filings, in addition
to nearly 78% of patents currently sitting in the backlog, would instead be substantially examined by the USPTO and not the INPI.
The result of this is the potential for Brazil to fundamentally outsource the bulk of its patent examination, including a significant part
of its backlog, to the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Brazil may be on the verge of making significant strides on its
plan for domestic economic growth through a functioning patent
system. The final results of the PPH Pilot Program currently in place
remain to be seen, as well as the results of any future patent work
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sharing agreements entered by the Brazilian Government. The country may be able to successfully implement these programs given its
existing challenges, but it will take an appropriate amount of investment and commitment. Nevertheless, it remains clear that Brazil is
serious about keeping up with a growing trend towards meeting research and developers’ demands of worldwide intellectual property
protection, and it is exploring new paths to achieve that goal.

